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INTRODUCTION AND PREVIOUS STUDIES
This study was made in an attempt to Identify some of the
factors that help an individual make accurate evaluations of
others
•
This line of research has interested many psychologists.
As early as 1927, Adams (l) found that averaging the judgments
of several observers gave a more accurate picture of a personality
than ratings by any one. Further, he stated there are two types
who judge others well: "(1) inferential (more inclusive and
less accurate) who observes, then rationalizes. He knows and
knows how he knows. (2) emotional (less inclusive and more
accurate) who emotionalizes by observations (a sort of pseudo-
empathy). He knows but knows not how he knows". Adams lists
these characteristics of a good judge of others: touchy, quick-
tempered, glum, moody, lacking In courage, independent, anti-
social or indifferent, egotistic, and not interest in, but
cold-blooded toward others, whom he uses as tools. "One who is
most interested In himself understands others best." This con-
clusion contradicts the hypothesis, frequently encountered, that
good judges of personality must themselves be well-adjusted.
Ten years later, in 1937, Allport (2) presented his ideas
on understanding others. In attempting to summarize and integrate
the existing literature Allport proposed that excellence of
judgment is most affected by (a) the Inherent ability of the
judge, (b) how overt, expressive, and well-defined are traits
being judged, and (c) how "open" or "enigmatic" the subject is. A
2good judge of others, according to Allport, will have experience,
will be similar to those he is judging, will be intelligent,
have insight, complexity and detachment.
While the field of intorpersonal perception is by no means a
now one, an increasing number of studies have been done in this
area in the pa3t three or four years. One of the most recent of
these (June 1955), by Webb (16), agrees with Adams* conclusion
that the number of Judgments affects accuracy. "Average group
ratings were reliable; (but these) group ratings were an average
of individual ratings which were no more reliable than (highly
unreliable) self-rating." While this finding affirms the con-
clusion that pooled ratings are more accurate than individual
ratings, it tells us nothing about the factors which influence
an individual's accuracy.
An often-used terra in this field is "empathy". Dymond (7, 8)
defines empathy as "the imaginative transposing of oneself into
the thinking, feeling and acting of another and so structuring
the world as he does". She states, "Differences of ability to
predict responses of others is greater than chance." Using her
rating scale, she found that females were slightly better pre-
dictors than nales and were more easily predicted than males. It
was easier for her subjects to predict the responses of an
individual who is highly ompathic. Individuals with empathy are
better adjusted and more secure. This conflicts with Adams' (1)
conclusions, that the best judges are anti-social and otherwise
somewhat maladjusted.
3Norman and Ainsworth (14) support this lino of theorizing
with their hypothesis that "projection would be negatively
related to both reality and empathy, but that the latter two
variables would be positively related to each other," To them
empathy (where the judge has "insight" into the other) requires
a realistic estimate of others, whereas projection (where the
Judges does not have insight* but projects his own responsos upon
others) does not require a realistic estimate of others. They
consider projection to be an unconscious, defense mech&nisra of
the ego and say that it inherently implies maladjustment, insecurity
and reality distortion. In their experiment, subjects filled out
a personality questionnaire (GAMIN) themselves and then estimated
how others would respond to the same questionnaire. The study
verified that "Reality and empathy would correlate more closely
with adjustment than would projection," On traits A IN, total
adjustment correlated with total projection at ,18, adjustment
with reality at .46, and adjustment with empathy at ,56. The
la3t two are significant at the one percent level.
In a similar study, Bender and Hastorf (3, 4) tried to
arrive at a measure of empathy which eliminates the effects of
projection. They found that the "forecaster s own score resembles
his forecast and his forecasts for different subjects resemble
each other." As a result of this, the Judge Is more accurate
if he actually resembles the subject being Judged. Bender and
Hastorf had undergraduates take the Allport-Vnrnon Scale of Values,
then had each choose an associate and predict his responses to
the same scale. They called the deviation of prediction from
4the actual responses of the associate the empathy score, and
the deviation of prediction from the predictor's own test score
the "projection" 3Core. They subtract the empathy score from
the projection score and call the resultant measure the refined
empathy score. It is not correlated with similarity while the
raw empathy score was. They felt that projection probably was
one reason why a successful forecaster of one subject could not
be expected to have similar success with other subjects.
Consider what is meant by "empathy", "projection", and similar
terms. These studios all employ the experimental model diagrammed
In Fig. 1.
As prediction
of B's responses
Three questionnaire administrations are involved: one which
obtains A's own responses, one obtaining B's responses, and one
obtaining A's prediction of B's responses. Now three measures of
similarity may be employed in analyzing these responses. The
extent to which A's and 3's responses coincide reflects the initial
similarity of the two. The degree of correspondence of A's own
responses to his prediction of B's responses reflects the extent
to which A assumes himself as similar to 3. The degree to which
A's prediction of B's responses agrees with B's own responses
determines the "accuracy" of A's prediction.
5Now the authors above define "empathy" as the accuracy
of prediction. "Projection" is defined operationally as a high
degree of similarity between A»s own responses and his prediction
of B's responses. As Cronbach (6) and Gage and Cronbach (10)
have pointed out, if A and 3 are similar and if A assumes he is
similar to B, then A will of necessity be accurate in his judg-
ments. Thus Dymond's finding that subjects who were "empathic"
were also easily predicted may simply reflect the fact that such
judges are more '"average", that is, more similar to most others.
This would also be reflected in adjustment.
Norman and ninsworth (14) label assumed similarity as
projection. They then say that projection implies maladjustment,
insecurity, and other negative attributes, and deduce that
high assumed similarity means maladjustment. The correlation
of ,18 between assumed similarity and adjustment indicates that
this may be true for some of their subjects. However, the fact
that Fiedler (9) has hypothesized that the assumed similarity
measure reflects "warmth of interpersonal relationships", and,
the further fact that it is realistic to assume oneself similar
to a person to whom one is actually similar, indicate that it
may be injudicious to consider assumed similarity as a pure
measure of projection with all the negative connotations
inplicit in the latter term.
Gage and Cronbach (10) have pointed out that when Bender
and Hastorf (3, 4) subtract "assumed similarity" from "accuracy"
to produce their neasuro of "refined empathy" they also eliminate
from the "empathic" category the realistic judgments of people
6who are actually similar to their partners. Gage and Cronbach
also point out that what may appear to be accuracy may be a
mental set to assume similarity. They emphasize that perception
of others demands different things of the judge in different
situations. A judge may be good at gathering information and
bad at drawing Inferences. Investigators should adequately
specify what they mean to measure.
It seems likely that such terms as "empathy" and "projection"
carry with them a load of surplus meaning which is attributed
to the measures used and which may interfere with the researcher's
interpretation of his results. If this is true, the more neutral
terms "similarity", "assumed similarity" and "accuracy" might
better be employed. This course will be followed throughout
this thesis.
According to Taft's review of the literature (15), social
detachment is prerequisite to the ability to judge people accu-
rately. The poor Judge is more socially orientated. The ability to
judge the traits of people Is "good In an egotist for although
he is cold-blooded and not Interested in others, he develops
a shrewd ability of measuring others, not as human beings,
but as tools". Taft summarizes studies which indicate that
Interpersonal perception is better in those of high dramatic
and artistic interests (but not ability) and in those of superior
Intelligence. Perception is also best in the well adjusted.
Leaders, salesmen, and those enjoying popularity are good judges,
but Taft points out that this may be due to ability to influence
others to respond as they wish them to respond.
7Those studies do seen contradictory. Characteristics
that correlate with accuracy in one study do not do so in
another. One reason for this is that accuracy of judgment
depends on the conditions and elements of the situation, as well
as on the characteristics of the Judge and/or subject being
judged. Most studies have concentrated on personality charac-
teristics in the Judge and ignored situational and other
determinants of accuracy.
One ignored determinant might well be the amount of
information the judge receives. Does information help in the
understanding of others? If so, what kinds of information and
how much would be most effective? Mot enough satisfactory
research has been done on this. According to Lorgo (12),
information about the frequency of particular responses to items
seems to be of greatest value. This knowledge improves the
ability of poor Judges by helping them to make Judgments less
extreme in error, so that their perception becomes comparable to
mediocre and good Judges.
An excellent summary of some of the studies mentioned and
of other previous studies In this field Is found in "The
Perception of People''' by Bruner and Taguiri (5). Their survey
of the literature "deals with two traditional areas of inquiry:
First, the recognition or Identification of emotions In others;
Second, the judgment or perception of personality." This study
is concerned with the latter.
8Bruner and Taguiri report that such things as culture,
role relationships, the factor of realism, the demands of the
situation and the internal state of the perceiver are of utmost
importance in forming impressions of other people.
In summary, we find that some investigations are con-
tradictory, some appear accurate over a small area, and some,
realizing their own limitations, urge further research. The
present study attempts to study two aspects of such Judgments:
the relationship between similarity and accuracy, and the effects
upon accuraoy of increasing the amount of information available
to the Judge. The following hypotheses were advanced:
A
- People who are similar are more accurate Judges than
those who are dissimilar*
3 - Judges with a relatively large amount of Information
about their partners will be more accurate than those
with relatively little information.
RESEARCH DESIGN
The participants in this study were drawn from two classes
of General Psychology at Kansas State College. All of the
students In these two classes were administered questionnaires
which Included (a) fourteen items from the California f scale,
(b) a list of fourteen occupations which the respondent was asked
to rank in order of preference, (c) seven items dealing with
attitudes toward negroes, and (d) seven items dealing with the
respondents attitudes toward himself. Only the P scale and
occupational choice responses were included In this study.
9Tho 8tudants were divided into three sections in such a
way that each section had the same mean F scale score. Each
section was assigned, at random, one of three experimental
variations, to be described below. In the experiment proper,
members of the sections were then given varying amounts of
information about other students and were asked to fill out the
questionnaire described above as they felt these others would
respond. In the following, students who estimated the responses
will be referred to as Judges (Js), and those who served as the
objaots of Judgment will be called subjects (Sa ).
The experimental treatment consisted In providing the three
sets of Js with varying amounts of information, as follows:
Variation Zf Js were given only the name and major field
of each 3 assigned to their group, and were asked to estimate
his responses to the questionnaire.
Variation II: Before making their estimates Js were given
the Ss name and major field, plus additional background infor-
mation (written on the blackboard) Including his age, his home
town, size of home town, his church membership and church
attendance, and his parent's occupation*
Variation III* Before making their estimates, Js were giver
all the information in Variation II, and in addition heard a
tape recording by the S of his Interests, goals and aspirations.
The recordings varied In length from one and one half to five
-ninutes.
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To facilitate collection of the data, the appropriate
information was ^resented to groups, ranging in number from
three to eight Js, Consequently, only those class numbers
wore accepted as Js whose free hours coincided with the free
hours of several other students.
Ss, whose responses the Js predicted, were selected from
a third section of General Psychology, They were selected on
the basis of having (a) free time in common with a large number
of Js, and (b) P scale scores which varied over a wide range.
In order to check on the consistency of a J*s accuracy of pre-
diction, it was decided to have each J predict the scores of four
different Ss, In order to provide for four Judgments by each
J and to fit In with the free hours of Js, a total of fourteen
Ss had to be selected.
In practice, then, during any one experimental hour three
groups of Js, representing subgroups from the larger experimental
sections, were present In three different rooms. The four Ss
present during a particular hour went to these rooms one at a
time and remained in each room while an Experimenter presented
the Js with the Information appropriate to their treatment.
The S then left the room and the Js attempted to predict his
responses to the questionnaire. »hen all the Je had finished
estimating the responses of one S, another S was brought in
until estimates had been made for each S,
Thus the J»s own responses to the questionnaire, the J's
prediction of the S«s responses, and the S»a own responses were
available for comparison.
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Because of a lack of time, four Js in Variation III and
two In Variation II were able to judge only three Ss. In
addition, one J In Variation III arrived late and Judged only
two 3s. Docause some Ss' schedules were more flexible than
those of others so that they were more often available for the
experiment, certain of the Ss wore Judged by more Js than were
others.
Cronbach's (6) profile similarity score was used in
analysing the accuracy of prediction for the P scale. The profile
similarity score is obtained by taking the difference between
the J's response and the S's response on each Item of the
questionnaire, squaring the difference, sunning the squares over
all items, and taking the square root of this sura.
Three profile similarity scores were obtained for each
judge-subject pair: (a) The profile similarity between a J's
own response and his prediction of a S's response was defined as
the J's assumed similarity to that S on the P scale, (b) The
profile similarity between a J's own response and a S's own
response was defined as the actual similarity between this Judge-
subject pair on the F scale, (c) The profile similarity between
a J's prediction of a S's response and the S's own response was
defined as the accuracy score of the J in predicting that S's
responses to the ? scale.
Spearman's rank order correlation method was used In the
analysis of occupational ranking. In the same manner as above,
three rank order correlation coefficients were computed for
each pair, "gain, assumed similarity was determined by comparing
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a J's own response with his prediction of a S's response,
actual similarity by comparing the J'o own response, with
the S's own response, and accuracy by comparing the prediction
of the J's estimate of the S»a response with the S»s actual
response
«
RESULTS
Relation Between Similarity and Accuracy
A few people Judged only two or three Ss, Therefore,
to facilitate statistical analysis, only those who Judged four
were included in this analysis.
For any Judge-subject pair, there are three sets of
calculations possible: (a) similarity between J and S; (b)
assumed similarity, that is, the similarity between J's own
pattern and his estimate of S's pattern; and (c) accuracy,
the extent to which J's estimates of S's responses coincide
with S's actual responses.
Therefore, the relationships between these variables were
computed for each J using Kendall's rank correlation coefficient,
tau (11). That Is, for each J the correlation was computed
between (a) his similarity to the four Ss and hi3 accuracy in
Judging them, (b) his similarity to Ss and the extent to which
he assumed himself similar, and (c) his assumed similarity and
his accuracy In Judging the S3,
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To determine the over-all relationship between these
variables, the actual distribution of correlation coefficients
was compared by means of chi square with the distribution to be
expected if the variables wero independent.
As Table 1 shows, the relation between similarity and
accuracy on the F scale is much higher than expected by chance.
Table 1. Relation between similarity and accuracy-F scale
Observed : Expected
/l. 00 & /,67
/.33
— ,33
-.67 ft -1.00
21
14
6
2
2
7.5
9.4
11.2
9.4
7.5
Total 45 45
x2-33.8l P< .001 dfT4
These re3ult3 support Jeldinger's (13) findings that
those who were similar were significantly more accurate in
Judgment than those who were dissimilar.
Table 2, Relation between similarity and assumed similarity-
F scale
Observed : Sxpected
/1.00 & /.67
/.33
— 33
-.67 k
-lloO
4
16
8
9
6
7.2
8.9
10.8
8.9
7.2
Total 43 43
x2«8.00 P > .05
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Table 2 presents the relation between assumed similarity
and actual similarity on the P scale. As can be seen, the
relationship is not statistically significant. Individuals do
not assume themselves as more similar to those whom actually
they resemble.
Table 3, Relation between assumed similarity and accuracy-
F scale
Observed
-be doc ted
/1.00 & /.67
/.33
- 33
-.67 A:
-1.00
Total
10
16
g
11
3
46
7.7
9.6
11.5
9.6
7.7
46.1
x-«10.6S f < .05
Table 3 represents the relation between assumod similarity
ami accuracy on the F scale. There is a low positive relation-
ship. Thus, a J who assumes himself similar to a S Is somewhat
more accurate in judging that S.
When one considers the relationship between the same three
variables In Judgments of occupational preference, the results
differ from those found In Judgments of the F scale, -hs shown
by Table 4, similarity of jttftga to subject does not affect
accuracy of Judging occupations, whereas accuracy and
similarity were highly related in F scale Judgments.
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Table 4, Relation between similarity and accuracy - occupations
Observed : Expected
A.00 & /.67
1 JUI
- 33
-.57 &
-l!5o
9
7
12
7
11
7.7
3.6
11-5
9.6
7.7
Total 46 46.1
x2«3.03 P > .50
Considering occupations again, Table 5 shows that the
relation between actual similarity and assumed similarity is
much higher than expected by chance. This is quite contrary
to the comparison of actual similarity and assumed similarity
on the F scale.
Table 5. Relation between similarity and assumed similarity -
occupations
Observed : Expected
/1.00 & /,67
/.33
-.33
-.67 & -1.00
23
8
8
6
3
8.0
10.0
12.0
10.0
8.0
Total 48 48
x2-34.57 P<
.001
6 compares assumed similarity and accuracy in relation
cupatlons. As may be seen when a J assumos himself similar
16
to the S he is judging ho is more accurate. However, It should
be noted that while the correlation ia positive, it la also
slight. The same is true of this relationship in judgments on
the F 3cale.
Table 6. Relation betwoen assumed similarity and accuracy -
occupations
Observed ; Expected
/l.00 & /.S7 13 7.7
A33 15 9.6
8 11.5
-.33 4 9.6
-.67 & -1.00 7 7.7
Total 47 46.1
x2.ll. 08 P< .05
Effects of Information Upon Accuracy
It was predicted that the Js who were given the most
information about £>s would be more accurate In their judgments
than those who received less information. As a measure of
accuracy, profile similarity scores were computed between
J* a estimates of the S and the S*a actual responses. An array
of accuracy scores wan made and the scores wore divided into
quartiles. oiartlle 1 represents the most accurate Judgments,
and -iuartile 4 reoresents the least accurate scores.
The correlation between accuracy and Increasing Information
in P scale judgments does not support the original hypothesis.
17
In fact, it Is slightly, but not significantly, in the opposite
direction (Table 7). Thus tore information about the S does
not increase the J's accura cy.
Table 7. Relation between a c curacy and amount of information on
the F scale.
Accuracy
io 8 1 : •• t Least
01 i : 04 : Total
Variation I 22 17 19 18 76
Variation II 20 17 20 17 74
Variation III 16 22 18 22 78
To tal 58 56 57 57 228
x2 2.57 P > .85 6
Table 6 snows the relationship between accuracy and the
amount of information when occupational preferences were judged.
It Is evident that the observed frequencies would be expected
by chance less often than five percent of the tine.
Table 8. Relation between accuracy and amount of information -
occupations
Amount of Information : nccuracy
iaost :
32
: :
: 43 :
Least :
Q4 : Total
Variation I 16 17 15 24 72
Variation II 24 17 13 18 73
Variation III 15 21 27 13 76
Total 55 55 55 55 220
x2 a 12.54 P< .05 df a 6
IS
However, deviations in Table 8 are not systematic. Thus,
Variation II has the largest number of Judgments in the most
accurate quartile, and the second largest number in the least
accurate quart J le and though Variation III unexpectedly has fewer
judgments than any other variation in the most accurate quartile,
it also has fewer than the other variations in the least accurate
quartile.
DISCUSSION
The results are inconclusive and raise certain questions.
Most especially, why do the results for judgments of P scale
scores and of occupations differ? Can it bo that the areas
In which judgments are made affect results? Can a Judge be
accurate about one facet of a personality and completely inaccurate
about another? If so, why? fill a Judge have more Insight
regarding others In areas where he himself Is best adjusted and
less insight in areas where he has some maladjustments? The
study raises more questions than it answers.
Can it bo that with regard to the F scale, it may hurt a
judge's ego to recognize himself in a subject but that with
regard to occupations it would not be as threatening to say,
"I am like this person"? But If one is similar and assumes he
Is similar, how can he be inaccurate so often, especially when
assumed similarity Is related to accuracy?
Why is one more accurate In Judgment when he assumes
himself similar to the subjoct he Judges? Perhaps he relaxes
19
when he thinks himself like the subject and therefore can pay
attention to cues of the individual whereas, if he feels himself
different from the subject, there must be more of an effort to
understand the subject so he tr.es harder but the results are
inaccurate because of tension and anxiety.
Prom the assumption that accuracy increases with information
one might change to the assumption that, with some degree of
information, an individual feels more qualified to Judge and,
therefore, makes more extreme judgments. This supports the axiom
"A little knowledge Is a dangerous thing". This may be a
possible explanation as to why accuracy did not Increase with
information.
The bare facts of historical background may give little
insight regarding an individual's ego. nnd for various reasons
a subject might exaggerate or otherwise falsify his goals and
aspirations. Also to be considered is the fact that college
students are seldom called on to make Judgments of their fellows
regarding their occupational preference or their P scale responses
Since students have no need to make this type of judgment of
their peers they are not proficient in it.
Purther study might Involve Judgments made after a few
years of association, either daily, intimately, socially,
occupationally, or socially and occupationally to discover If
there is any point at which accuracy increases.
Also of interest is the question whether a person of broader
and more varied experiences is a better Judge of people • XS^"^/a^
20
as a final qualification of those results, the Judges, so
far as is known, had no strong motivation for accurate judgment.
The consequence of their evaluation had no effect on them as
individuals or even as a group. Stronger motivation might
produce greater accuracy.
SUMMARY
A questionnaire, containing Items from the California P
scale and a list of occupational preferences, was administered
to students in general psychology classes at Kansas State College.
Some of these students were designated as Judges and some were
designated as subjects on the basis of time available. Judges
again completed the questionnaire, this time answering as they
felt a subject would. Most Judges made judgments on four subjects
after meeting the subject and receiving varying amounts of
information about them as follows: Variation I-only subject's
name and major field were given; Variation Il-name, major field
and some biographical data were given; Variation III-the same
Information as Variation II plus the addition of a tape recording
of the subject telling his goals and aspirations in life.
Judges were assigned to the variations in such a way that
each variation had the same mean F scale score,
Cronbach's profile similarity score was used in analysing
accuracy of judgment on the F scale. Spearman's rank order
correlation method was used in analysis of occupational ranking.
Three rank order correlation coefficients were computed for each
Judge-subject pair. Assumed similarity, actual similarity, and
accuracy wore compared.
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The results ere Inconclusive.
Judgments on the F scale showed that similarity does produce
greater accuracy, but in occupational Judgments accuracy and
similarity were unrelated. In both areas when a Judge assumed
himself similar to a subject he was more accurate In Judging
that subject.
Increasing information did not increase accuracy in judgment
as was expected.
22
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ABSTRACT
This is a study of two aspects of interpersonal perception:
the relationship between similarity and accuracy, and the effects
upon accuracy of increasing the amount of Information available
to the Judge.
The hypotheses tested were:
A„ People who are similar are more accurate Judges
than those who are dissimilar. This holds especially when
they also think they are similar.
B, Judges with a relatively large amount of information
about their partners will be more accurate than those with
relatively little information.
A questionnaire, containing items from the California F
scale and occupational preferences, was administered to students
in general psychology classes at Kansas State College. Some of
these students were designated as Judges and some were designated
as subjects on the basis of time available. Judges again
completed the questionnaire, this time answering as they felt
a subject would. Moat judges made Judgments on four subjects after
meeting the subject and receiving varying amounts of information
about them as follows: Variation I-only subject's name and major
field were t;iven; Variation II-name, major field, and some bio-
graphic data were given; Variation III-the same information
as Variation II plus the addition of a tape recording of the
subject telling his goals and aspirations in life.
Judges were assigned to the treatments in such a way that
each treatment group bad the same mean F scale score.
2Cronbach's profile similarity score was used in analyzing
accuracy of judgment on the F scale. Spoarnxan*3 rank order
correlation was used in analysis of occupational ranking. Three
rank order correlation coefficients were computed for each
judge-subject pair. Assumed similarity, actual similarity,
and accuracy were compared.
Results were inconclusive.
Judgments on the F scale showed that similarity did mean
more accuracy but in occupational Judgments accuracy and
similarity wore unrelated. In both areas, when a judge assumed
himself similar to a subject he was more accurate in judging
that subject.
